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Nontraditional Mortgage Products: Does Guidance Effectively
Inform Borrowers of Risk?
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been said many times that owning a home is part of
the "American Dream." Surely then, losing one's home to
foreclosure must be part of the "American Nightmare. '
Unfortunately, the latter scenario is one facing many American
borrowers who have elected to utilize one of the nontraditional
mortgage products2 now being aggressively marketed by lenders
and the mortgage broker industry. For example, take Tom and
Kitty Woolover, who, in 2004, purchased their first home as a
young couple in the Washington, D.C. area for $400,000.' Upon
speaking with a mortgage broker, the Woolovers decided to use a
payment-option mortgage product4 to finance their home. This
nontraditional mortgage product allows the Woolovers to make
minimum monthly payments, which start at $1,287 per month
1. Mara Der Hovanesian, Nightmare Mortgages, Bus. WK, Sept. 11, 2006, at 70.
2. Nontraditional mortgage products, such as interest-only loans and payment-
option adjustable rate mortgages (payment-option ARMs), "allow borrowers to
defer payment of principal and, sometimes, interest." Interagency Guidance on
Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed. Reg. 58,609 (Oct. 4, 2006). These
products are also sometimes referred to as "exotic" or "alternative" mortgages. Id.
See infra notes 20-27 and accompanying text for a detailed description of
nontraditional mortgage products.
3. This example is a hypothetical adopted from a report by the United States
Government Accountability Office. Calculated Risk: Assessing Non-Traditional
Mortgage Products: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Transportation
and Subcomm. of Economic Policy of the H. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 4-5 (2006) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Orice M.
Williams, Dir. Fin. Market and Cmty. Inv. Team, Gov't Accountability Office),
available at http://banking.senate.gov/index.cfm?Fuseaction= Hearings.Detail&Hear
inglD=239.
4. See infra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
5. Hearings, supra note 3, at 5. William's testimony provides an overview of the
methodology that was used in determining this payment amount. See id.
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 11
during the first year of their five-year payment-option period.6
With a combined, annual household income of $150,000, the
Woolovers confidently felt they could afford this amount If the
Woolovers choose to make only the minimum payment, however,
throughout the entire five-year period, their monthly payment
would skyrocket by 128% to $2,931 at the end of the payment-
option period." If the Woolovers are unable to refinance their
home, they stand a good chance of defaulting on their mortgage
payments and losing their home in a foreclosure sale.9
In response to concerns about protecting consumers like
the Woolovers, the U.S. depository regulatory agencies
(Agencies) 10 issued a proposed guidance (Proposed Guidance)" in
December of 2005, and a final guidance, entitled Interagency
Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks (Final
•12
Guidance), on September 29, 2006.1' The Final Guidance was
issued after a vast amount of industry debate over its necessity,
6. The payment option period is the initial period of the loan in which the
consumer can choose the amount of payment to make, which usually consists of three
payment choices: the minimum payment, the interest-only payment, and the fully
amortizing payment. Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product
Risks, 71 Fed. Reg. at 58,618 app.
7. See generally Hearings, supra note 3 (illustrating this example with an
assumed household income).
8. Id. at 5. In her statement, Ms. Williams notes that the lender most likely
would have qualified the borrower in year one at the fully indexed payment amount
of $2,039 (as opposed to the minimum payment amount). The payment amount in
year six of $2,931, however, is still 44% more than the $2,039 payment amount used
to qualify the borrower in year one. Id at 5 n.2. The Final Guidance attempts to
remedy this by requiring inclusion of any potential negative amortization amount in
the calculation of the loan terms. See infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
9. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 5.
10. The agencies include the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury
Dept. (OCC), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board), the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Office of Thrift Supervision,
Treasury Dept. (OTS), and the National Credit Union Administration. Interagency
Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed. Reg. 58,609, 58,609
(Oct. 4, 2006).
11. Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Products, 70 Fed. Reg.
77,249 (Dec. 29, 2005).
12. Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed.
Reg. at 58,609.
13. Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Financial
Regulatory Agencies Issue Final Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product
Risks (Sept. 29, 2006), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/toolkit/newsrelease.aspx
?JNR=1&Doc=M3ZM5FQW.xml.
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effectiveness, and scope. 4 In the ten-month period between the
publication of the Proposed Guidance and the Final Guidance, the
Agencies received input from all interested parties on what form
the Final Guidance should take to most effectively and prudently
carry out the Agencies' goals. 5 This Note argues that despite the
Final Guidance's questionable enforceability and scope, it, along
with the accompanying commentary, hearings, and legislative
action resulting from its publication, accomplished what the
Agencies set out to do - alert consumers and the mortgage
industry now to the dangers of nontraditional mortgage products
and encourage modification of the laws so as to account for the
products' added risk.
Part II of this Note provides a basic overview of
nontraditional mortgage products and examines some of the
conditions in the mortgage industry and market that necessitatedS 16
such a guidance. Part III summarizes the Final Guidance and its
purpose - in particular as it relates to consumer and borrower
protection. 7  Part IV of this Note examines some of the
controversial issues of the Final Guidance through analyzing its
necessity, effectiveness, and sufficiency." Finally, Part V will
argue that the Agencies were effectively able to meet the majority
of their goals, despite the Guidance's limited enforcement power
and non-applicability to entities outside its regulation.' 9
II. NONTRADITIONAL MORTGAGE PRODUCTS AND THEIR RISKS
The two primary types of nontraditional mortgage products
are the interest-only mortgage loan and the payment-option
adjustable rate mortgage (ARM).20 The interest-only mortgage
14. The Agencies received approximately 100 official Comments regarding the
Proposed Guidance. See Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product
Risks, 71 Fed. Reg. at 58,610.
15. See Press Release, Federal Financial Regulatory Agencies Issue Final
Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, supra note 13.
16. See infra notes 20-55 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 55-85 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 86-209 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 210-37 and accompanying text.
20. See Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71
Fed. Reg. 58,609, 58,613 (Oct. 4, 2006).
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requires the borrower to pay only the interest due on the loan for a
specified number of years (typically three or five years) during
which time the interest rate may be fixed or variable.2 ' After the
interest-only period, the borrower is required to pay both interest
and principal, which totals a much larger amount than the interest-
only payments. 2 A payment-option ARM permits the borrower to
choose the amount of the payment each month: the borrower may
make a minimum payment based on an introductory "teaser" rate,
an interest-only payment, or a fully amortizing payment based on a
traditional fifteen-year or thirty-year loan. 3 Borrowers, however,
face serious risks if they make only the minimum payment because
often, that payment amount is not enough to cover the interest
accruing on the loan, which results in negative amortization.2 4
Thus, the borrowers may owe more when the payment-option
period expires than when they signed the loan.25 Additionally, the
interest rate resets to the current market rate at the end of the
payment-option period,26 which may compound the consumer's
problem of an increased principal amount if interest rates have
risen. These two occurrences - a larger amount owed and a higher
interest rate - result in a significantly elevated monthly payment
for the borrower.27
21. Id. at 58,618.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. "Negative amortization... is an amortization method in which the borrower
pays back less than the full amount of interest owed to the lender each month. The
shorted amount is then added to the total amount owed to the lender." Negative
amortization, Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Negative-amortization (last visited Dec. 21, 2006).
25. See id.
26. The exact terms of option loans may vary. Some option loans provide that
the interest rate will reset earlier than the expiration of the payment option period if
the principal amount plus interest owed reaches a certain amount; this may occur
where the borrower is not paying the interest accruing each month. Also, some
favorable consumer loans put a cap on how much the interest rate can increase when
the loan resets, but the lender may recapture that interest in a subsequent year. See
Brochure, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Interest-Only Mortgage
Payment and Payment-Option ARMs - Are They for You, at 3-4 (Oct. 2006),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/mortgage-interestonly.
27. See id. The Agencies have published a brochure on interest-only and
payment option loans to provide a plain-language resource for borrowers thinking
about utilizing a nontraditional mortgage. It also provides a succinct explanation of
the interest-only and payment-option loans. See id.
[Vol. I11
2007] RECENTAGENCYA CTIONS
The situation experienced by the Woolovers, our home-
buyers, is particularly alarming in light of the increased popularity
28
of nontraditional mortgage products. According to The
Washington Post, whereas only 1% of new home-buyers obtained
a nontraditional mortgage loan in 2000, that number had risen to
approximately 33% in May 2006.29 As illustrated with the
Woolovers, the problem with these nontraditional products is that,
even more than traditional ARMs,30 they "can carry a significant
risk of payment shock and negative amortization that may not be
fully understood by consumers., 31  According to a comment
submitted by the Center for Responsible Lending (CRL), "[i]n the
current 2006 interest rate environment, as teaser rates expire on
[one set of nontraditional loan products originated in 2004], 97.5%
of [those] borrowers are likely to face an implicit payment shock of
at least 25% and three of four (75%) could face a shock of 50% or
more."
32
28. See Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71
Fed. Reg. 58,609, 58,609 (Oct. 4, 2006).
29. Kirstin Downey, Insurers Urge Action on Risky Mortgages, WASH. POST, Aug.
19, 2006, at D1 (citing data provided by First American LoanPerformance, which
tracks mortgage statistics). The concentrations of nontraditional products increases
in higher priced markets. Approximately one-half of home borrowers in
Washington, D.C. used such products in May 2006. Id. Approximately 44% of
California borrowers refinanced with payment-option ARMs in the first half of 2006.
Vikas Bajaj & Ron Nixon, Variable Loans Help to Put Off Mortgage Pain, N.Y.
TIMES, July 23, 2006, Late Edition at 1.
30. Traditional ARMs work much like payment-option ARMs, with the primary
difference being that during the option period, payment-option ARMs give
borrowers a choice of what type of payment to make: the minimum payment, the
interest-only payment, or a traditional fully amortizing payment. Like payment-
option ARMs, traditional ARMs have an interest rate that fluctuates periodically
(either up or down), often in relation to an identified index rate. Payment-option
ARMs, however, have the additional risk of negative amortization. See generally Bd.
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Consumer Handbook on Adjustable Rate
Mortgages (ARM) (May 2005) [hereinafter CHARM Booklet], available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/ pubs/arms/arms _english.htm (explaining ARMs and
their associated risks).
31. Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed.
Reg. at 58,616.
32. Comment submitted by Deborah N. Goldstein & Jamie Z. Goodson, Center
for Responsible Lending, to the Federal Reserve Board (Mar. 29, 2006) [hereinafter
CRL Comment], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/
ProposedRegs.cfm (follow "view comments" hyperlink located beneath "Interagency
Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgages" hyperlink). The CRL calculated these
figures based on data from the Loan Performance Subprime Asset-Backed Securities
Database. It interpreted data for one type of payment-option loan, (2/28 hybrid
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The Washington Post, citing information from the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), reports that
approximately 70% of the borrowers utilizing a payment-option
ARM choose to make only the minimum payments.33 With
upwards of 30% of borrowers using such mortgages, a large
proportion of homeowners can expect to experience payment
shock when their interest rates adjust.34 Those who cannot afford
the higher payments are stuck with three options: refinance, sell,
or default.35  In the past, consumers have had little trouble
refinancing due to a robust housing market, low interest rates, and
good appreciation in housing prices.36 The ability to refinance
diminishes, however, when home prices stop going up and the
borrower's debt, due to negative amortization, has surpassed the
value of the home.3 7 In addition, nearly 60% of interest-only and
payment-option loans originated in 2005 carried a prepayment
penalty,38 which the borrower would be forced to pay if the loan
was refinanced.39
As recent trends show, the outlook is not good for those
betting on a continued boom in the housing market.4° The New
ARM loans), which carry a "fixed interest rate for two years and a variable rate
semiannually adjusted for the remaining 28 years." Id. at 9. It looked at such loans
that originated in the year 2004. See id.
33. Downey, supra note 29. Business Week reported the percentage of payment-
option ARM borrowers making minimum payments at closer to 80%. Der
Hovanesian, supra note 1 (citing data from Fitch Ratings).
34. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
35. CRL Comment, supra note 32, at 10.
36. See generally Hearings, supra note 3 (explaining that higher interest rates and
lack of appreciation may lead to payment shock).
37. See Bajaj & Nixon, supra note 29.
38. A prepayment penalty is triggered when a borrower pays all or a portion of
the mortgage debt before it is due. Freddie Mac, Borrower Information Guide
Prepayment Penalty Mortgages (Aug. 2006), available at http://www.freddiemac
.com/singlefamily/pdf/ppm.pdf. This penalty is only triggered in most loans during
the first few years, but, with ARM loans, that is the time-frame when most borrowers
will experience the payment shock which may make prepayment desirable. See Bajaj
and Nixon, supra note 29. Generally, refinancing or even selling the loan, will
constitute prepayment and may trigger the penalty. Freddie Mac, supra note 38.
39. See In Focus this Quarter: The Evolution of the Credit Cycle, FDIC OUTLOOK
1, 26 (Summer 2006) [hereinafter FDIC OUTLOOK], available at http://www.fdic.gov/
bank/analytical/regional/ro20062q/na/t2q2006.pdf (citing data from the
LoanPerformance Corporation).
40. James R. Hagerty, Home Prices Keep Sliding, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 2006, at
D1.
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York Times reported that "prices of traditional single-family
dwellings fell in [eighty-seven] of the nation's 379 major
metropolitan areas" from the first to the second quarter of 2006.
Furthermore, in August of 2006, the median sales price of existing
homes dropped nearly 2% from a year earlier to $225,000, which
represented the first year-to-year decline in sales prices in a
decade and the second largest price decline ever recorded.42 This
drop was in stark contrast to the growth seen between 2002 and
2005, when there was a 34% increase in the median home sale
price nationwide from $158,000 to $212,000.4' The American
Bankers Association (ABA) commented in late March 2006 that
"there are a number of markets around the country that have
shown rapid increases in housing costs, and consumers want these
[nontraditional] mortgages because housing prices have become
much less affordable without the use of interest-only mortgages,
payment-option ARMs, or variations of such products." 44 Therein
lies the problem: as consumers struggled to "afford" housing in the
midst of the housing boom of the early twenty-first century, the
mortgage industry marketed these nontraditional loan products
that temporarily allowed consumers to meet their mortgage
payment.45 Consumers have often purchased homes utilizing these
products that they could only "afford" at the minimum payment-
46
option ARM payment or via an interest-only payment . Worse
yet, the ability of the borrower to refinance these types of loans is
41. Vikas Bajaj, Mortgages Grow Riskier, and Investors Are Attracted, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 6, 2006, at C1.
42. See Michael Corkery, Existing Homes' Median Price Falls, WALL ST. J., Sept.
26, 2006, at A2. This type of data has been collected for nearly forty years. Id.
43. Open Forum: The Need for Guidance, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, Aug. 7, 2006,
at 4, available at http://www.lexis.com.
44. Comment submitted by Paul A. Smith, Senior Counsel, American Bankers
Association, to the Board, at 3 (Mar. 29, 2006) [hereinafter ABA Comment] (on file
with the Board), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/
ProposedRegs.cfm (follow "view comments" hyperlink located beneath "Interagency
Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgages" hyperlink).
45. See Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71
Fed. Reg. 58,609, 58,609 (Oct. 4, 2006) (indicating an increase in the number of
institutions offering nontraditional products).
46. See generally Bajaj & Nixon, supra note 29 (indicating that these products can
be used to qualify for a larger loan amount and put off payment shock by
refinancing).
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dependent on the same inflated housing market that initially
forced them to resort to the nontraditional products.47
The ABA points out that the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (OCC) and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTC)
authorized federally chartered banks to offer ARMs with negative
amortization features 48 to consumers in 1981. 4' The ABA suggests
that the reason for that authorization, much like today, was that
"consumers could no longer obtain the housing that they wanted
using the fixed-rate mortgages then available at extremely high
interest rates."5 °  The difference, though, was that in 1981
consumers could not afford their desired housing due to extremely
high interest rates.51 Now, however, with interest rates near historic
lows, it is the appreciated price of the house that the consumer is
attempting to overcome.2 This is an important distinction because
in 1981, a borrower selecting an ARM stood a good chance of
seeing the interest rate go down when the rate reset.53 Today, in
contrast, interest rates are on the rise from historic lows.5 4 Thus, it
47. See id.
48. See Adjustable-Rate Mortgages, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,932 (Mar. 27, 1981) (codified
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 29); Adjustable Mortgage Loan Instruments, 46 Fed. Reg. 24,148
(Apr. 30, 1981) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 545).
49. ABA Comment, supra note 44, at 2. Due to the success of ARMs and
concerns about state-chartered entities suffering from a competitive disadvantage,
Congress later enacted the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982. See
12 U.S.C. § 3801 (2000). This Act expressly allowed state-chartered institutions to
offer ARMs and preempted any state law to the contrary. See 12 U.S.C. § 3803
(2000).
50. ABA Comment, supra note 44, at 2.
51. Freddie Mac: Weekly Mortgage Market Surveys, http://www.freddiemac.com/
pmms/pmms30.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2006). In October 1981, the 30-year
mortgage rates peaked at 18.45%. Id.
52. Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Adopting Restatement Mortgage
Subrogation Principles: Saving Billions of Dollars for Refinancing Homeowners, 2006
BYU L. REV. 305, 306. "Beginning in April 2002, the United States experienced an
astonishing decline in residential mortgage interest rates. The thirty-year fixed-rate
mortgage, usually considered the standard or bell-weather of the industry, had been
near 7% since the beginning of 2001. But in April 2002, it began a remarkable
plunge, reaching a low of 5.21% in June 2003." Id. The mortgage rate remains at or
near 6.18% today. Freddie Mac's Weekly Primary Mortgage Market Survey,
http://www.freddiemac.com (last visited Jan. 3, 2006).
53. This conclusion is drawn from the fact that in 1981, interest rates were near
historic highs. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
54. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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is most likely that a borrower will see interest rates and payments
increase as the loan's interest rate resets.
55
III. SUMMARY OF THE FINAL GUIDANCE AND ITS CONSUMER
PROTECTION CONCERNS
A. Purpose and Goals
The Agencies issued the Final Guidance as a result of
increasing concern that these nontraditional mortgage products
were being marketed to a larger proportion of borrowers, many of
whom did not understand the risks involved in these loans and
some who would not otherwise qualify for a loan.56 The Agencies
hoped "to clarify how institutions can offer these products in a safe
and sound manner, and in a way that clearly discloses the potential
risks that borrowers may assume." 57  With nontraditional
mortgages, the Agencies have heightened concern because of
negative amortization and the lack of principal amortization, and
the Final Guidance is intended to address these concerns.58 With
those goals in mind, the Final Guidance addresses the following
topics: (1) consumer protection concerns, such as assuring that
borrowers understand the loans; (2) appropriate risk-management
practices and standards; and (3) "prudent lending practices" in
underwriting these loans. 9 It is the first of these topics, consumer
protection concerns, that forms the crux of this Note.
55. With interest rates rising from historic lows, the loan payment amount would
increase as it resets to the rising market rates. This is especially true of those who
took out a nontraditional loan in 2003 or 2004. See supra note 52 and accompanying
text.
56. Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed.
Reg. 58,609 (Oct. 4, 2006).
57. Id at 58,609.
58. Id. Amortization is "the paying off of debt in regular installments over a
period of time." Amortization normally results in the amount owed by a borrower
decreasing. See Investopedia.com, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/amorti
zation.asp (last visited Dec. 21, 2006).
59. Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed.
Reg. at 58,613.
2007]
NORTH CAROL[NA BANKING INSTITUTE
B. Borrower Protection and Comprehension
The negative amortization that often results from
nontraditional loans (specifically payment-option ARMs) leads to
lower home equity than in a traditional mortgage.60 Under such
circumstances, home equity may have greatly declined or been
completely eliminated when the home-owner sells or refinances
• 61
the home, even when the value of the property has appreciated•.
The Agencies' main consumer protection concerns are that the
wave of new consumers utilizing these products do not understand
the risks of these products in a non-ideal62 scenario, and that the
institutions offering the products are not making adequate
disclosures to consumers to enable them to better understand
these potential risks.63 As a result, the Final Guidance provides a
number of recommended practices for addressing the risks
associated with the nontraditional products that institutions and
lenders offering these products should implement.64 Those
recommended practices include ensuring that all communications
with borrowers - including oral conversations, advertising and
promotional materials, and monthly statements - accurately reflect
65the loan terms and payment arrangement. Institutions need to
present information to borrowers in a clear and concise format,
free of excessively technical language, so that the borrowers
understand the terms, realize their importance, and can make an
informed decision.66
The Final Guidance suggests that "promotional materials
and descriptions of these products" should include information
60. Id. at 58,616.
61. Id.
62. A non-ideal scenario references market conditions such as rising interest rates
when those rates are adjusted and the possibility of declining homes prices. It also
includes consumer behavior such as only making minimum payments on a payment
option loan or selecting a product that has prepayment penalties if refinancing.
63. See Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71
Fed. Reg. 58,609, 58,616 (Oct. 4, 2006) (indicating concern that "marketing and
promotional practices that emphasize potential benefits without also effectively
providing complete information about material risks" do not fully inform the
consumer).
64. See id. at 58,617-18.




about payment shock, negative amortization, and prepayment
penalties.67 For instance, a product description for a nontraditional
product should include not only initial payments, but also
potential, future maximum monthly payments. 6" This estimate
could include the required payment amount "once amortizing
payments are required and the interest rate and negative
amortization caps have been reached. '' 69 The Final Guidance also
indicates that monthly statements to consumers utilizing a
payment-option loan should clearly illustrate the effect of choosing
one payment over another.70 For instance, if in one month the
borrower chooses to make the minimum payment, as opposed to
the interest-only or fully amortizing payment, the monthly
statement should clearly indicate that choosing that payment will
increase the outstanding balance due to negative amortization.7
In addition to these disclosures, lending institutions should not
make excessively optimistic predictions about the future direction
of interest rates or one-sided assurances about the amount of
72
money that can be saved by using a nontraditional mortgage.
The lender must make explicit that paying only the minimum
payment may not cover the interest accruing on the loan and that
interest rates on the loan are subject to change in the future.73
C. Control Systems and Risk Management
The Final Guidance also touches on control systems that
should be put in place by institutions to assure compliance with
these recommended practices.74 The Guidance indicates that
federal lenders are responsible for monitoring not only the
marketing and disclosure practices on loans that it originates
internally, but also on those loans originated by its subsidiaries and
67. Id.
68. See id.
69. Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed.
Reg. 58,609, 58,617 (Oct. 4, 2006).




74. See generally id. at 58,615 (describing proper control systems).
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third-party mortgage brokers.75 It directs institutions to monitor
their compensation programs - including third-party broker
incentives - to ensure that loan originators are not encouraged to
direct borrowers to inappropriate nontraditional mortgages.76
Furthermore, the Guidance says that "[m]onitoring procedures
should track the quality of loans by both origination source and
key borrower characteristics," and if problems are discovered,
corrective action should be taken which may include terminating
the relationship with the third-party originator.7  The Agencies
also add that the control systems should address compliance and
fair disclosure concerns, as well as provide lending personnel with
78adequate training on educating consumers properly.
D. Prudent Lending - Qualifying the Borrower
One of the most controversial portions of the Final
Guidance is the required qualification process for a borrower
seeking a nontraditional mortgage. The Final Guidance provides
that:
[A]n institution's analysis of a borrower's
repayment capacity should include an evaluation of
their ability to repay the debt by final maturity at
79(the fully indexed rate,79 assuming a fully amortizing
repayment schedule. In addition, for products that
permit negative amortization, the repayment
analysis should be based upon the initial loan
amount plus any balance increase that may accrue
from the negative amortization provision. 8°
75. See Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71
Fed. Reg. 58,609, 58,615 (Oct. 4, 2006).
76. Id. at 58,618.
77. Id. at 58,615.
78. Id. at 58,618.
79. "The fully indexed rate equals the index rate prevailing at origination plus the
margin that will apply after the expiration of the introductory interest rate .... The
margin is the number of percentage points a lender adds to the index value to
calculate the ARM interest rate at each adjustment period." Id. at 58,614 n.5.
80. Id. at 58,614.
[Vol. I11
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The Final Guidance also requires that when calculating the
amount added to the initial loan amount due to negative
amortization, the lender must assume that the borrower makes
only the minimum payments.8' These qualification standards have
two consequences. First, a lender cannot qualify a borrower who
might not otherwise qualify for a loan by using an initial teaser
rate or the interest-only payment.82 Second, requiring the lender
to include an assumed amount of negative amortization in the
initial principal amount extended increases the amount of debt for
which the borrower must be qualified.83 This prevents the lender
from calculating an artificially low debt-to-income ratio.84  The
Agencies believe that only by using these qualification standards
can an institution provide a "credible analysis of a borrower's
capacity to repay the full amount of credit.., extended." 85
IV. CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES REGARDING THE FINAL GUIDANCE
The Agencies' Final Guidance was received with both
praise and criticism. This is not surprising considering that the
Agencies received ninety-one comments86 from various sources,
including trade associations, lenders, brokers, and consumer
advocate groups, during the ten-month comment period between
issuing of the Proposed Guidance and publication of the Final
Guidance.87
81. Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed.
Reg. at 58,611 (Oct. 4, 2006).
82. See Comment submitted by the Nat'l. Consumer Law Ctr. to the Fed.
Reserve Bd., at 4 (Mar. 29, 2006) [hereinafter NCLC Comment], available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/ProposedRegs.cfm (follow "view
comments" hyperlink located beneath "Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional
Mortgages" hyperlink).
83. See Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71
Fed. Reg. at 58,611.
84. The debt-to-income ratio sets a limit on how much of a borrower's income
can be devoted to a mortgage payment. Lee Ann Obringer, How Mortgages Work,
http://money.howstuffworks.com/mortgage3.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2006).
85. Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed.
Reg. at 58,611.
86. Id. at 58,610. The Agencies actually received 100 comments, but only ninety-
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A. Necessity of the Final Guidance
1. Are Nontraditional Mortgages Really so Risky?
The ABA, the largest banking trade association in the
country, believes that the Final Guidance overstates the risks of
nontraditional mortgage products.8 As stated earlier,8 9 the ABA
argues that the Agencies have not shown that "the risks in
[nontraditional] mortgage products have materially changed since
they were created over two decades ago" at the express
authorization of the Agencies.9 The ABA fails to acknowledge,
however, that the prevalence of these mortgages among the
average consumer is much greater now than when these products
were created, dramatically increasing the population exposed to
the risks.91 Furthermore, current interest rates2 are not at the
historic highs of the early 1980s, but rather are slowly rising from
historic lows.93 Consumers now face a greater risk of interest rate
and payment increases than in the early 1980s.94 The National
Consumer Law Center (NCLC), a consumer advocate group,
notes that, "[u]nless . . . lenders underwrite the maximum
payment, and disclose that information to consumers, neither
consumers nor the market are taking the risk of interest rate
increases into account, creating a significant danger of economic
instability. '" 95  The ABA, however, correctly points out that
consumers want nontraditional mortgages because "housing prices
88. ABA Comment, supra note 44, at 2.
89. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
90. ABA Comment, supra note 44, at 3.
91. Hearings, supra note 3, at 4. Whereas, in 2002, interest-only and payment-
option ARMs represented as little as 3% of total nonprime mortgage originations
that were securitized, by late 2005, that percentage of mortgage origination was
hovering around 50%. See FDIC OUTLOOK, supra note 39, at 24. Among all
borrowers, nontraditional mortgage products represented 33% of all mortgage loans
originated in May 2006. Downey, supra note 29 (citing data provided by First
American LoanPerformance, which tracks mortgage statistics).
92. 6.18% for a 30-yr mortgage as of December 28, 2006. Weekly Primary
Mortgage Market Survey, www.freddiemac.com (last visited Jan. 3, 2006).
93. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
94. Id.
95. NCLC Comment, supra note 82, at 6.
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have become much less affordable without [their] use., 9 6 Perhaps,
however, the solution lies in recommending to consumers that they
consider lower-priced homes that they can afford with a traditional
mortgage rather than a higher-priced home that is only
temporarily affordable with a nontraditional mortgage. 97 The
ABA, however, appropriately observes that "[t]he goal of
underwriting is not to prevent all defaults, but to evaluate the risk
and make mortgage credit available at a price that reasonably
reflects risk." 98 At some point, consumers must take responsibility
for the financial decisions that they make.
The National Association of Mortgage Brokers (NAMB)
agrees with the ABA and argues that the Final Guidance is
"overly strict" and "prescriptive. '" 99 The NAMB believes that the
Final Guidance "could result in purposeful elimination of viable
loan products that have served in the past, and continue to serve
today, a real customer need. ' °° Some recent data from the third
quarter of 2006 showing a reduction in the number of
nontraditional loans originated provides some support for the
NAMB's contention. 1 This data, however, which is from the
three-month period immediately prior to publication of the Final
Guidance, may also reflect some other market conditions, like the
96. ABA Comment, supra note 44, at 3.
97. Cf. Der Hovanesian, supra note 1 (indicating that lenders marketed
nontraditional products as "affordability tools" allowing borrowers to afford higher
priced homes).
98. ABA Comment, supra note 44, at 5.
99. Comment submitted by James L. Nabors, II, Former President, Nat'l Ass'n of
Mortgage Brokers, to the Fed. Reserve Ed., at 9 (Mar. 31, 2006) [hereinafter NAMB
Comment], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/Proposed
Regs.cfm (follow "view comments" hyperlink located beneath "Interagency
Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgages" hyperlink).
100. Id. at 10. Nontraditional mortgages do serve certain borrowers very well.
For instance, such mortgages may be very useful to wealthy borrowers who have an
irregular income stream or borrowers who expect to have a large income increase in
the future. See Der Hovanesian, supra note 1; Hearings, supra note 3, at 4. The use
of nontraditional mortgages for these purposes, however, is not what the Agencies
were concerned about.
101. Wall St. Round-up; Fewer ARM Bond Issues Likely, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24,
2006, at C4. "Washington Mutual Inc., the largest U.S. savings and loan, and
Countrywide Financial Corp., the largest U.S. mortgage lender, originated fewer
payment-option ARM loans in the third quarter" of 2006, with Washington Mutual's
origination of the loans down 25% from a year earlier and Countrywide's down 49%
respectively. Id.
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softening of the housing market. °2 The NAMB, nevertheless,
believes forcing lenders to qualify borrowers under the "worst case
scenario" is unfair where the "likelihood of such scenarios is
minimal or nonexistent. '"103  The NAMB argues that
"[a]ccountability and enforcement [would] be much more effective
mechanisms in controlling the risk associated with nontraditional
loan products than consumer choice. '°  Such enforcement,
however, depends on the uninformed borrower bringing to light
such lender or originator abuses, which is unlikely considering the
complexity of laws governing lender and broker disclosure
requirements.
2. Should Existing Lending Laws be Enough?
Several organizations, including the ABA, argue that the
Final Guidance is unnecessary due to existing lending laws and
disclosure requirements and may actually increase confusion
among borrowers.05 Mortgage products are already subject to
numerous disclosure requirements under the Truth-in-Lending
Act'06 (TILA), and its implementing regulation, Regulation Z, °w
and under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC
Act).1 0 Neil J. Morse, a mortgage industry consultant, agrees with
the ABA and points out that "[m]ortgage companies labor under a
jungle of laws, including ... [TILA], [the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act of 1974]09 (RESPA), the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act 10 (ECOA), the Home Ownership and Equity
102. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text. This is somewhat of a chicken-
or-the-egg scenario. It is not clear whether the slowing of the housing market has led
to a reduction of loan originations, or, alternatively, whether the decreased
willingness of borrowers to take out nontraditional mortgages has led to the
borrowers' inability to afford higher priced homes, thereby slowing the housing
market. It is most likely a combination of the two, as opposed to either one or the
other.
103. NAMB Comment, supra note 99, at 10.
104. Id.
105. ABA Comment, supra note 44, at 2.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000).
107. 12 C.F.R. § 226.1 (2006).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2000).
109. 12 U.S.C. § 2601 (2000).
110. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2000).
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Protection Act.. (HOEPA), the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act' 2
(HMDA), and [the] Fair Credit Reporting Act"3 (FCRA).... 4
Morse adds, "[i]n sum, regulatory compliance has gone from being
a sleepy afterthought to a heavy burden; a potentially make-or-
break proposition for lenders (and others in the mortgage food
chain) ....","5 Prior to publication of the Final Guidance, the
North Carolina Bankers Association, another bank trade
organization that submitted an official comment, complained:
Any plan to add yet another series of disclosures
should also include a corresponding plan to review
existing disclosure requirements to determine which
ones are not worthwhile and can be eliminated or
consolidated. Consumers, and bankers for that
matter, are suffering from information overload and
measures need to be taken to pare back the
volume.'
1 6
The ABA hoped that any new disclosures would be
provided in the form of a generic disclosure or included in an
already existing handbook, such as the Consumer Handbook on
Adjustable Rate Mortgages (CHARM booklet),'17 rather than an
individual disclosure tailored to each borrower's loan."8 The
NAMB also was more in favor of updating existing disclosure
111. 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (2000).
112. 12 U.S.C. § 2801 (2000).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).
114. Neil J. Morse, The Compliance Battle, 63 MORTGAGE BANKING 28, Sept.
2003.
115. Id.
116. Comment submitted by Nathan R. Batts, Associate Counsel, North Carolina
Bankers Association, to the Fed. Reserve Bd, at 2 (Feb. 21, 2006), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/ProposedRegs.cfm (follow "view
comments" hyperlink located beneath "Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional
Mortgages" hyperlink).
117. The booklet, developed previously by the Agencies approximately twenty
years ago, explains the features and risks of ARMs but does not specifically address
payment-option ARMs or interest-only mortgages. See CHARM Booklet, supra note
30.
118. ABA Comment, supra note 44, at 12; see also NAMB Comment, supra note
99, at 7 (arguing that the Agencies' recommended information pertaining to the risk
and benefits of nontraditional mortgages simply be added to the CHARM booklet).
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requirements and better enforcing them than adding some of the
oversight that the Final Guidance requires. 9  The NAMB
suggested updating the CHARM booklet because it already is a
requirement of both state- and federally-regulated lenders. The
NAMB also rightfully points out that "[a] disclosure by itself is
insufficient to accomplish the stated objective of ensuring that a
borrower is aware of the risks and benefits of the nontraditional
loan product because the inherent complexity of such products
require specific explanations that will be too overwhelming and
detailed in a written context.' 12' The NAMB recommended that
any additional disclosure also be accompanied by consumer
testing22 so that it will not "be just another paper added to a pile of
disclosures that is already largely ignored by consumers. 1 23 The
NAMB felt that better enforcement of existing laws could also
solve some of the problems that the Final Guidance seeks to
address. For example, the NAMB suggested increasing the use
of the Agencies' already existing power under section 5 of the FTC
Act, which regulates unfair and deceptive trade practices.' 1
Despite these protests regarding the Final Guidance adding
additional disclosure requirements, the Agencies did not wane in
their requirement of new nontraditional mortgage-specific
• 126
disclosures. The Agencies' primary justification is that
"guidelines are needed now to ensure that consumers will receive
the information they need about the material features of
nontraditional mortgages as soon as possible."'27  Other than
adding nontraditional mortgage-specific disclosure information,128
119. NAMB Comment, supra note 99, at 5-9.
120. Id. at 7.
121. Id. at 6.
122. Consumer testing would consist of the process of evaluating the effectiveness
of additional disclosures to borrowers. See id. at 7-8. The Agencies could get the
opinions of the average borrower on the effectiveness of the disclosures and whether
they add anything of benefit prior to adding them as part of the Final Guidance. Id.
123. Id. at 8.
124. Id. at 8-9.
125. NAMB Comment, supra note 99, at 8-9.
126. See Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71
Fed. Reg. 58,609, 58,612 (Oct. 4, 2006).
127. Id.
128. This is certainly the most significant addition to consumer disclosures that the
Final Guidance adds to borrower protection. See generally id. at 58,612 (indicating
[Vol. I I
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the only significant addition to existing lending laws that the Final
Guidance provides is in terms of the "timing" of such disclosures.9
It was the Agencies' intention to have these additional disclosures
assist the consumer in the product-selection process, which may
occur before disclosures are required under TILA or other lending
laws. 30 "The [G]uidance focuses on providing information to
consumers during the pre-application shopping phase and post-
closing with any monthly statements lenders choose to provide to
consumers.""13  The Final Guidance suggests that the disclosure
information about the risks of nontraditional mortgage products
should be provided "when a consumer is shopping for a mortgage.
. . not just upon the submission of an application or at
consummation.'1
32
B. Effectiveness of the Final Guidance
1. Is the Guidance Enforceable?
An initial question regarding the Final Guidance must be
about how it will be enforced.'33  The only references to
enforcement in the Final Guidance are passing statements
indicating that noncompliant institutions "will be asked to take
remedial action"' 4 and "will be subject to elevated supervisory
attention and potential examiner criticism." '35  The lack of
language regarding enforcement in the Final Guidance is most
one of the differences of the Final Guidance's disclosures is the timing). It is
arguable, however, that this still could have been accomplished through the
modifications of existing lending law disclosures like the CHARM booklet. See
NAMB Comment, supra 99, at 10-13.
129. Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed.
Reg. at 58,617.
130. Id. at 58,616.
131. Id. at 58,612.
132. Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed.
Reg. at 58,617.
133. See NCLC Comment, supra note 82, at 5 (arguing that the Final Guidance
does not lead to any enforceable sanctions).
134. Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed.
Reg. at 58,613.
135. Id. at 58,615.
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likely due to the nature of a guidance document itself.136 Law
professor Robert A. Anthony writes that the use of nonlegislative
documents, such as guidances, "to bind the public violates the
Administrative Procedures Act,"'37 and that "[a]n agency may not
make binding law except in accordance with the authorities and
procedures established by Congress.' ' 138  He adds that with the
exception of "a legislative rule (which binds legally) or an
interpretive rule (which may bind practically) . . . , [a]ll other
substantive rulemaking documents - such as policy statements,
guidances, manuals, circulars, memoranda, bulletins, and the like -
are ... 'policy statements' which the agency is not entitled to make
binding., 139 In issuing the Final Guidance, the Agencies clearly
had the intention of effecting change now. 40  Logically, the
Agencies understood that a formal rule or an amendment to
current lending laws most likely would have taken significantly
more time to complete.1 4' The Final Guidance, although perhaps
not legally enforceable, serves the purpose of addressing
nontraditional mortgage risk concerns and providing Agency
direction to lenders until current lending laws can be amended or
supplemented. 141
2. Applicability to Nonfederally Regulated Lenders
Another major complaint that the ABA had regarding the
Final Guidance was that it would not apply to those lending
institutions and brokers not subject to the Agencies' regulation.143
The Final Guidance applies only to "federally-insured institutions
136. See generally Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements,
Guidances, Manuals, and the Like - Should Federal Agencies Use them to Bind the
Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1312-15 (1992) (explaining the effectiveness of guidance
as binding law).
137. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000).
138. Anthony, supra note 136, at 1312.
139. Id. at 1315.
140. See Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71
Fed. Reg. 58,609, 58,612 (Oct. 4, 2006).
141. Cf. id. (suggesting that the immediacy of the threat posed to consumers by
these products requires present action).
142. Id.
143. ABA Comment, supra note 44, at 12.
[Vol. I11
RECENTAGENCYACTIONS
and their holding companies and their nonbank subsidiaries."' 44
The mortgage broker 41 community, however, plays a major role in
the consumer-mortgage loan process and is often the major point
of contact for a borrower. 46  In fact, "85 to 90% of loans are
'brokered loans,' which includes mortgage brokers, correspondent
lenders, and any lender that does not service the loan for a period
longer than three months.' ' 147 As the major point of contact for
consumers, consumer protection policy must reach this group of
individuals to be effective.
Mortgage brokers as a whole, however, have some conflicts
of interest that leave little incentive for them to voluntarily
implement strong consumer protection policies.148 First, lenders
may provide an incentive structure to mortgage brokers that
encourage them to market one type of mortgage over another to
consumers. 4 9 One assistant U.S. attorney has suggested that "[i]n
2004 banks began offering fatter sales commissions on payment-
option ARMs to encourage brokers to push them."'"5  Thus, a
mortgage broker, acting in the broker's own self-interest, may
recommend a nontraditional mortgage to a consumer not because
it fits the consumer's needs, but because the mortgage broker will
earn a higher commission. 15' The NAMB readily admits that the
144. Id. at 10.
145. National Association of Mortgage Brokers FAQ page, http://www.namb.org/
namb/FAQsl.asp?SnID=1854943273 [hereinafter NAMB FAQ page] (last visited
Dec. 21, 2006). "A broker is a real estate financing professional acting as an
independent contractor .... There are circumstances when brokers may act as
bankers, funding their loans. However, the majority perform origination services up
to the point of funding." Id.
146. See id.
147. Calculated Risk: Assessing Non-Traditional Mortgage Products: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Transportation and Subcomm. on Economic
Policy of the H. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 2
(2006) (statement of George Hanzimanolis, President-Elect, Nat'l Ass'n of Mortgage
Brokers), available at http://banking.senate.gov/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Hearings
.Detail&HearingID=239. Estimates of the actual percentage of loans originated by
mortgage brokers differ, but it is safe to say that, whatever the actual percentage, it is
well over a majority of all consumer mortgages. See, e.g., NAMB FAQ page, supra
note 145 (indicating that two out of every three consumers use a broker).
148. See generally Der Hovanesian, supra note 1 (arguing that commissions and
incentives provided to brokers by lenders present conflicts of interest).
149. See id. at 70.
150. Id. (quoting Gail McKenzie, an assistant U.S. attorney in Atlanta).
151. Id. But see Response by Harry Dinham, President, NAMB, http://www.namb
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broker works neither for the borrower nor the wholesale lender.
Thus, mortgage brokers must balance the interests of both lender
and borrower.153
Another factor that may decrease a broker's incentive toS ,,114
reduce costs for the borrower is the "yield-spread premium.
Yield-spread premiums are "side payments by lenders to mortgage
brokers for persuading borrowers to agree to higher interest rates
when the lenders in fact are willing to extend credit to the
borrowers at lower rates.' 55 While perfectly legal, problems arise
because lenders provide different yield-spread premiums for
different types of loans, which may give a broker an incentive to
sell one loan over another. 56 The NAMB contends, however, that
mortgage brokers also have incentives to provide consumers with
the best possible customer service, as the broker is not
compensated until the loan closes.'57 The consumer, however,
often does not become unhappy with a nontraditional loan until
rates adjust.' 58 At that point, it is the bank's name, as opposed to
the mortgage broker's, which is on the loan, and the bank bears
the brunt of the consumer's complaints. 9 So if mortgage brokers
are so bad for consumers, why do so many continue to use them?
Some suggest this is because "[o]ftentimes, borrowers may receive
a better rate and term on their loan program by going through a
mortgage broker rather than if they went directly to a lender. This
is because lenders provide brokers with wholesale rates and terms
.org/Images/namb/IndustryNews/HarryDinham NewsweekLetter.pdf (last visited
Jan. 22, 2006) (rejecting many of the accusations that mortgage brokers steer
consumer to loans that pay the highest commissions).
152. NAMB FAQ page, supra note 145.
153. See generally id. (suggesting that the broker, as an independent contractor,
provides services both to the lender and the borrower).
154. See Peter J. Hong, J.D., & Marcos Reza, Hidden Costs to Homeowners: The
Prevalent Non-Disclosure of Yield Spread Premiums in Mortgage Loan Transactions,
18 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 131,136 (2005).
155. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law
and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEx. L. REV. 1255, 1264 (May 2002).
156. Hong & Reza, supra note 154, at 136.
157. NAMB FAQ page, supra note 145.
158. Cf. Der Hovanesian, supra note 1 (showing examples where borrowers first
go to their lenders with complaints when rates adjust).
159. Id.
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that are not available to the general public..'' Though yield-
spread premiums may encourage brokers not to offer the lowest
interest rate that they have available, brokers contend that the
consumer's ability to shop around for lower rates encourages the
brokers to maintain competitive rates.
61
The NAMB also believes that the borrower is not the only
one who needs to be educated on the use of nontraditional loans,
an opinion echoed by the Agencies in the Final Guidance. 162
Supplementary, nontraditional loan-specific education needs to be
provided to all loan originators so that originators can properly
convey the information to borrowers.163 Disclosures to consumers
will only be effective if the originator is properly trained and
educated.' 64 The NAMB seems to believe that when a broker
suggests a nontraditional mortgage product for an inappropriate
consumer, it is not due to misplaced incentives or intentions, but
rather an unintentional act by a broker not properly educated
about those products. 65  The NAMB suggests pre-licensure
education requirements as a possible solution.166 Additionally, for
those situations where a mortgage broker intentionally acts against
the consumer's interest, the NAMB suggests criminal background
checks as a solution. These background checks, however, would
only be effective in preventing those already convicted of a crime
from becoming brokers. Further, brokers who provide
inappropriate, nontraditional loans to borrowers may not view
themselves as having committed a wrong. Rather, brokers might
see themselves as having helped a borrower obtain a home that
might not otherwise have been attainable. 69
160. Hong & Reza, supra note 154, at 131-32.
161. NAMB FAQ page, supra note 145.
162. See Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71
Fed. Reg. 58,609, 58,618 (Oct. 4, 2006) (recommending additional training on these
products to lending personnel).
163. NAMB Comment, supra note 99, at 2-3.
164. Id. at 11.
165. Id. at 3.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 4.
168. Cf. NAMB Comment, supra note 99, at 9 (suggesting that nontraditional
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The NAMB concedes that mortgage brokers are not
regulated by the Agencies and, therefore, are not subject to the
Final Guidance.1 Mortgage brokers, however, are far from
unregulated and without oversight - "[t]he [mortgage broker]
industry is regulated by seventeen federal laws and numerous state
and federal regulations."' 1 The states have taken on the role of
regulating the state-licensed mortgage brokers and nonbank
lenders and were actively involved in the Proposed Guidance
discussion leading up to the Final Guidance.' State regulation,
however, is not comprehensive and can be rather piecemeal, with
applicable laws varying from state to state.' The states, however,
are attempting to address the issues discussed in the Final
Guidance. 74 The Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS), 75
in conjunction with the American Association of Residential
Mortgage Regulators (AARMR), 76  developed a companion
170. Id. at 2.
171. NAMB FAQ page, supra note 145. These laws include the aforementioned
RESPA, TILA, HOEPA, FCRA, ECOA, and FTC Act, as well as state oversight by
their mortgage regulator, attorney general, and/or their state agency where
applicable. Calculated Risk: Assessing Non-Traditional Mortgage Products: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Transportation and Subcomm. of Economic
Policy of the H. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 3-4
(2006) (statement of George Hanzimanolis, President-Elect, Nat'l Ass'n of Mortgage
Brokers).
172. See Comment submitted by Neil Milner, President and CEO, Conference of
State Bank Supervisors, to the Fed. Reserve Bd. (Feb. 14, 2006) [hereinafter CSBS
Comment], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/Proposed
Regs.cfm (follow "view comments" hyperlink located beneath "Interagency
Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgages" hyperlink).
173. Cf John C. Dugan, Comptroller, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
Remarks at the 2006 America's Community Bankers Convention, at 8 (Oct. 17,
2006), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2006-115a.pdf. (indicating that
state regulators are developing a companion guidance, but that they will have to urge
the individual state agencies to adopt the guidance when completed in order to have
uniform regulation).
174. See Conference of State Bank Supervisors, Guidance on Nontraditional
Mortgage Product Risks (Nov. 14, 2006) [hereinafter CSBS Guidance],
http://www.csbs.org/Content/NavigationMenu/RegulatoryAffairs/FederalAgencyGui
danceDatabase/CSBS-AARMRFINALGUIDANCE.pdf.
175. "The CSBS is the national organization of state officials responsible for
chartering, regulating and supervising the nation's 6,250 state-chartered commercial
and savings banks and over 400 state-licensed branches and agencies of foreign
banks." CSBS Comment, supra note 172.
176. The AARMR is a corporation formed to promote the exchange of
information among state employees who are responsible for the administration and
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guidance aimed at state-licensed residential mortgage brokers and
mortgage companies not affiliated with a bank holding company or
an insured financial institution.177 The parallel guidance, when and
if adopted by the individual state regulators, will force the
mortgage broker and state-licensed lender community to put
similar procedures in place as those in the Final Guidance, and,
therefore, eliminate any significant competitive advantage that the
Final Guidance would have provided to them."
It is the above concerns that led the ABA, who has many
member lenders subject to the Final Guidance, to argue that if any
new consumer protection requirements are implemented, they
should be accomplished pursuant to a formal rulemaking or an
amendment to a current disclosure rule, rather than in the form of
an Agency guidance.7 9 The Guidance's non-uniform application
will force federal banks and their subsidiaries to make additional
disclosures - more than those already required by all lenders,
regulated and non-regulated alike.' 80 Consumers may, in turn,
perceive the banks' nontraditional mortgage products as more
expensive or riskier, and, perhaps, this will have the ironic effect of
pushing consumers toward the non-regulated lenders who are not
' .1 181
subject to the disclosures recommended by the Final Guidance.
regulation of mortgage brokers and mortgage lending. See AARMR Homepage,
http://www.aarmr.org (last visited Dec. 21, 2006).
177. CSBS Guidance, supra note 174.
178. See id. Similar to the enforceability of the federal Final Guidance, the CSBS
guidance's enforceability will depend on the states and their regulatory entities
individually passing laws with similar substance. See Letter from Neil Milner,
President and CEO, CSBS, to Stephen J. Adler, Editor-in-Chief, Business Week
(Dec. 19, 2006), http://www.csbs.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=PressReleases
_Archives&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=9438 (indicating that
nineteen states have thus far adopted the CSBS guidance). Both the CSBS and the
AARMR are organizations designed to assist those state entities responsible for
regulating state-chartered banks and mortgage brokers respectively. Any guidance
suggested by the CSBS and AARMR is only effective insofar as the state regulatory
members of these organizations adopt laws mirroring their recommendations. See
AARMR homepage, supra note 176; CSBS - What Is CSBS, http://www.csbs.org/
Content/NavigationMenu/AboutUs/WhatisCSBS/WhatIsCSBS.htm (last visited Dec.
21, 2006).
179. ABA Comment, supra note 44, at 12.
180. Id. at 10.
181. Id. at 11.
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3. Federal Lenders' Regulation of Their Broker Counterparts -
Control Systems
The Final Guidance requires regulated lenders to provide
"oversight of third parties," which includes mortgage brokers or
correspondents.8 2 According to the Final Guidance, "[o]versight
of third parties should involve monitoring the quality of [loan]
originations so that they reflect the institution's lending standards
and compliance with applicable laws and regulations.'
183
Federally-regulated lenders had argued that this "would force
lenders to have an awareness and control over third-party
practices that is neither realistic nor practical."' 184 In only a few
years' time, one bank can do business with several hundred
mortgage brokers.8' To expect a bank to monitor the origination
and disclosure practices of all those brokers would be time-
consuming and very costly. 186 The ABA believes that the net effect
of requiring such monitoring is that banks will choose to do
business with fewer mortgage companies since banks can only
justify the monitoring cost for brokers who provide significant loan
volume.8 7  The counterargument, however, is that those
noncompliant brokers would change their disclosure practices and
origination polices - which was one of the goals of the Proposed
and Final Guidances in the first place - in order to maintain those
business relationships.88 Based on the Agencies' unwillingness to
change the control systems requirements in the Final Guidance, it
appears lenders are "responsible for overseeing the marketing and
borrower disclosure practices of third parties,"' 89 despite the high
cost of such monitoring about which lenders complained.
182. Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed.
Reg. 58,609, 58,615 (Oct. 4, 2006).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 58,612; see ABA Comment, supra note 44, at 12.
185. ABA Comment, supra note 44, at 12.
186. See id.
187. Id.
188. See generally Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product
Risks, 71 Fed. Reg. 58,609, 58,618 (Oct. 4, 2006) (requiring lenders to monitor their
third-party originators like brokers to ensure compliance).
189. Id. at 58,612.
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C. Sufficiency of the Final Guidance - The Suitability Standard
Consumer advocacy groups questioned whether the Final
Guidance would actually help protect consumers since it "does not
carry the same force as a law or regulation."' 90 Therefore, while
the goals of the Final Guidance were commended, some argue the
Agencies need to go further and establish a suitability standard.'9'
It is suggested that the "mortgage lenders follow the lead of the
securities industry and require that mortgage borrowers be not
only eligible for a product but also suitable - meaning the loan
won't impose hardship."' 92 The National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD) 93 has expressly enacted a suitability requirement
for the customers of the security brokers that it regulates. 94 The
requirement in essence says that "a salesperson 'should
recommend only securities that are suitable to the needs of the
particular customer."" 95  While the Securities and Exchange
Commission has not itself expressly adopted a suitability standard,
it has read a suitability requirement into section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 193496 and its corresponding Rule 10b-
5197 that is substantially similar.
190. Hearings, supra note 3, at 15; see supra notes 133-42 and accompanying text.
191. One of the main concerns of the ABA was "that the agencies are creating a
new 'appropriateness' or 'suitability' standard." ABA Comment, supra note 44, at 9.
The Final Guidance, however, does explicitly reject the idea of suitability.
Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed. Reg. at
58,612.
192. Der Hovanesian, supra note 1; see also Engel & McCoy, supra note 155
(arguing for a suitability standard in the subprime lending market similar to that in
the securities industry).
193. The NASD is "the primary private-sector regulator of America's securities
industry. [It] oversee[s] the activities of more than 5,075 brokerage firms . . .and
more than 662,800 registered securities representatives." NASD - About NASD,
http://www.nasd.com/AboutNASD/index.htm.
194. See NASD Manual, Rule 2310, available at http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/
display/display.html?rbid=1189&element-id=1159000466. The rule states that "[i]n
recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security, a
member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is
suitable for such customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such
customer as to his or her security holdings and as to his financial situation and
needs." Id.
195. Engel & McCoy, supra note 155, at 1318.
196. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn (2000)).
197. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006); see Engel & McCoy, supra note 155, at 1322-28.
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With those ideas in mind, the NCLC describes its idea of
suitability in the mortgage industry as follows:
[T]he originator or lender owes a duty of good faith
and fair dealing to borrowers in the origination of a
home loan. The creditor will reasonably ensure that
the loan is suitable for the borrower's purpose,
including but not limited to the borrower's
circumstances, borrower's objective in obtaining the
loan and the borrower's ability to repay. 198
Authors of one law review article take it a step further, saying
"[c]ourts have held that an agency relationship exists between a
mortgage broker and the broker's client when the broker has a
duty to act primarily for the benefit of his or her client in matters
connected with mortgage loans."1 99 Regardless of the existence of
an agency relationship, "the concept of suitability" would provide
"a way to hold lenders accountable and to secure redress for
borrowers that are harmed." 200 The NCLC adds: "[1]ending
without regard to repayment ability is only permitted by lenders
because they can collect on the collateral - someone's home.
Because lenders can protect themselves from losses through
collateralization, securitization, 20 ' and other means, there is little
market incentive to ensure the affordability of the loans.,
202
Lenders and brokers, however, do not support a suitability
standard.20 ' They believe that ultimately it is the borrowers whom
must take responsibility for the loan decisions that they make.2°4
198. Brian Collins, ARMs Raise "Suitability" Issue, MORTGAGE LINE, Sept. 11,
2006.
199. Hong & Reza, supra note 154, at 135 (citing various cases).
200. Collins, supra note 198.
201. "Securitization is the process of converting packages of loans into securities
that are backed by collateral in the form of loans." Engel & McCoy, supra note 155,
at 1274. By selling nontraditional loans to the secondary market, lenders both free
up cash for additional lending and reduce or eliminate the risk inherent in these types
of loans. Id. The purchasers of these loans in the secondary market can better offset
the risk of nontraditional loans by bundling them with safer, conventional loans. Id.
202. NCLC Comment, supra note 82, at 7.
203. See, e.g., ABA Comment, supra note 44, at 9.
204. Collins, supra note 198.
[Vol. I11
RECENTAGENCYACTIONS
Joe Falk, Legislative Chairman of the NAMB, was quoted as
saying, "[w]e believe reasonable protections should be available to
both sides of the transaction," which he indicated included lenders
that act in a responsible manner.205 The ABA is in agreement and
stated in its comment that "[w]e are concerned that the Agencies
are creating a new 'appropriateness' or 'suitability' standard that
we are very reluctant to see applied in lending, if 'suitability' is to
mean something other than creditworthiness. ''2 06 The ABA points
out that
[w]e would expect the first response of an applicant
who is told that while the lending institution deems
him or her to be creditworthy, nonetheless the
lender is denying the application on the grounds
that the mortgage product is simply 'not
appropriate' for the applicant, will be to file a fair
lending complaint. 7
In the Final Guidance, the Agencies ultimately came down
on the side of the lenders and brokers. The Agencies explained
that they in no way were attempting to establish a suitability
requirement - "[i]t was not the Agencies' intent to impose such a
standard, nor is there any language in the guidance that does so.
2 8
The Agencies went so far as to remove any language from the
Final Guidance that might even be interpreted as suggesting
lenders have a duty to provide only products deemed "suitable" to
borrowers.2 9
205. Id.
206. ABA Comment, supra note 44, at 9.
207. Id.
208. Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed.
Reg. 58,609, 58,612 (Oct. 4, 2006).
209. Id. It is interesting to note that nowhere in the Proposed Guidance was there
any language specifically referencing suitability. This may have been a preemptive
strike by the ABA to assure that no such language entered the Final Guidance -
especially in light of the considerable discussion given to the issue in consumer
advocacy groups' comments on the Proposed Guidance.
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V. CONCLUSION
The effects of the Final Guidance on the mortgage
industry, and in particular on the marketing of nontraditional
mortgage products, may not be known for months, or even years
down the road. Nevertheless, the public comment process leading
up to the Final Guidance21 ° has called significant attention to the
dangers and risks of nontraditional mortgage products. These
results are seen in the prevalence of news coverage that resulted
from the debate over what form the Final Guidance should take,21
in the ongoing modifications to current lending laws , and in the
actions being taken by state regulators in response to the Final
Guidance.213
Both prior to and since publication of the Final Guidance,
the issues revolving around the dangers of nontraditional
mortgages have undergone extensive discussion. Around ninety-
one comments, from many different lenders, brokers, and
advocates, were generated discussing the issues involved in the
Final Guidance. 214 A plethora of news articles and media coverage
have resulted,215 and multiple hearings before Congress and the
various regulatory agencies were held. As a result of this
coverage, ordinary consumers are more aware of the dangers of
nontraditional mortgages - a goal which the Final Guidance set
216
out to achieve.
Additionally, some of the suggestions made by lenders,
brokers, and advocates about improving disclosures were already
210. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
211. See, e.g., Der Hovanesian, supra note 1.
212. See infra notes 214-24 and accompanying text.
213. See infra notes 225-31 and accompanying text.
214. Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed.
Reg. 58,609, 58,610 (Oct. 4, 2006).
215. One industry expert has even gone so far as to suggest that the news media
has been the best source of information for borrowers regarding the dangers of
nontraditional mortgages. See James Comtois, Industry Pro Critical of Regulators, 16
ORIGINATION NEWS 26, Dec. 2006. The expert suggests the federal regulators have
been lax in doing their job. Id.
216. See generally Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product
Risks, 71 Fed. Reg. at 58,610 (indicating that one of the main concerns is that
"consumers are provided clear and balanced information about the relative benefits
and risks of [nontraditional mortgage] products").
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taking place within the Federal Reserve Board even before
issuance of the Final Guidance.2 7  In her testimony before a
Senate Committee, Sandra F. Braunstein, the Director of the
Division of Consumer and Community Affairs within the Board,
indicated that a revision of Regulation Z, the Board's
implementing regulation for TILA, is already underway.1 8 She
indicated that "immediate steps" are being taken "to improve the
information consumers receive about alternative mortgages.
2 19
Some of those steps include "revising the CHARM booklet" and
"publishing a consumer education brochure., 220  These are the
exact steps that the ABA and NAMB had suggested.22'
Furthermore, "in determining how to improve disclosures... the
Board will conduct extensive consumer testing to determine what
information is most important to consumers, when that
information is most useful, what wording and formats work best,
and how disclosures can be simplified, prioritized, and organized
to reduce complexity and information overload., 222  This will
address both mortgage brokers' and advocates like the CRL's
concerns that disclosures not be overburdensome yet still be
"meaningful" and "effective.,,223 Most importantly, these TILA
disclosure and CHARM booklet changes will apply to all lenders,
since all are required to comply with those regulations. 4
In light of the above modifications, the Final Guidance is
already well on its way to achieving its goals of alerting consumers
to the dangers of nontraditional mortgages and ensuring that
217. See Calculated Risk: Assessing Non-Traditional Mortgage Products: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Transportation and Subcomm. of Economic
Policy of the H. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 1
(2006) (statement of Sandra F. Braunstein, Dir., Div. of Consumer and Cmty. Affairs,
the Fed. Reserve Bd.) [hereinafter Braunstein Statement], available at
http://banking.senate.gov/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Hearings.Detail&HearinglD=239.
218. Id. at 2.
219. Id. at 9.
220. Id.
221. See ABA Comment, supra note 44, at 12-13; NAMB Comment, supra note 99,
at 5-6.
222. Braunstein Statement, supra note 217, at 9.
223. See NAMB Comment, supra note 99, at 5-8; CRL Comment, supra note 32, at
12-13.
224. Braunstein Statement, supra note 217, at 11; ABA Comment, supra note 44, at
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lenders and brokers are adequately informing borrowers about the
risks of these products. The Agencies indicate in the Final
Guidance that "they do not anticipate that the information
outlined in the guidance will result in additional lengthy
disclosures."'25 A large reason for this is that, with the
modification of existing lending laws to include disclosures about
the risks of nontraditional mortgage products, the Agencies'
disclosure concerns are going to be adequately addressed in
formal, enforceable rule form.226  The Final Guidance was
necessary, however, due to the immediacy of the Agencies'
concerns about these products.227 The Agencies were able to alert
the general public and possibly curb some lender abuses even prior
to any formal legislative action. In that sense, the Final Guidance
was indeed effective.
Additionally, despite its limited scope, the publication of
the Final Guidance has also been able to effect meaningful change
in the non-federally regulated lending community and the state-
regulated broker community. In the Final Guidance,
[t]he Agencies note that both [s]tate financial
regulatory organizations that commented on the
proposed guidance - the [CSBS] and the State
Financial Regulators Roundtable (SFRR) - [are]
committed to working with [s]tate regulatory
agencies to distribute guidance that is similar in
nature and scope to the financial service providers
under their jurisdictions. 228
With the issuance by the CSBS of its parallel guidance that
"substantially mirrors" the federal Final Guidance, much of the
concern that the nonfederal lending entities not subject to the
Final Guidance will gain some competitive advantage from not
225. Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed.
Reg. 58,609, 58,612 (Oct. 4, 2006).
226. See supra notes 217-24 and accompanying text.
227. See id.




being required to make similar disclosures should be alleviated.229
It is a fact that not all brokers are state-regulated, but the
Guidance at least has been able to stimulate change in the
recommendations provided by the entities that do regulate brokers
on the state level.230 Regardless, as mentioned, the advantages of
the revisions currently being done to TILA and the CHARM
booklet are that they would apply to all lender entities3
While the Agencies should be commended for the
meaningful changes that the Final Guidance has initiated, it goes
too far in requiring additional disclosures in the "shopping
phase., 232  Loan originators will find themselves warning
consumers about products even before the borrower has expressed
a sincere interest in such products. Further, such disclosures are
unnecessary if the proposed changes to existing disclosure laws are
carried through.2 3  The Final Guidance, however, did make the
right choice on the issue of suitability. The Agencies' purpose in
the Final Guidance was to inform consumers of the risks involved
in nontraditional mortgage products, to make sure lenders were
properly underwriting the loans, and to make sure the loan
originators were adequately informing borrowers of the products'
234dangers. It was not the Agencies' intention to fundamentally
overhaul predatory lending laws through establishment of a
suitability standard.235
In summary, despite the questionable enforceability and
scope of the Final Guidance, the commentary, hearings, and
legislative action that led up to the Final Guidance's publication
accomplished what the Agencies set out to do - alert consumers
229. CSBS Guidance, supra note 174, at 1.
230. See Brian Collins, Tough Guidelines on Exotics Pushed, 16 ORIGINATION
NEWS 1 (Nov. 2006).
231. See Braunstein Statement, supra note 217, at 11; ABA Comment, supra note
44, at 13.
232. See Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71
Fed. Reg. 58,609, 58,612 (Oct. 4, 2006) (indicating that the "guidance focuses on
providing information to consumers during the pre-application shopping phase").
233. See generally ABA Comment, supra note 44, at 11 (arguing additional
disclosures during the shopping period may confuse borrowers and reduce
effectiveness of existing lending law disclosures).
234. See Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71
Fed. Reg. at 58,609-10.
235. See id. at 58,612.
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and the mortgage industry now to the dangers of nontraditional
mortgage products and encourage modification of law so as to
account for the products' added risk. One only needs to look at a
comment recently made by Frederick Cannon, an analyst with a
full-service investment bank, in discussing the effects of the
Agencies' Final Guidance: "[t]he publicity is a contributing factor
in the downdraft of volumes that we're already seeing [with
payment-option loans]. You don't go to a cocktail party and brag
about your 1% loan anymore, because somebody will have read
Business[]Week236 and say, 'I know what you got, and you're
nuts. ,,237
STUART M. RIGOT
236. This is presumably a reference to the Business Week article entitled
Nightmare Mortgages. See Der Hovanesian, supra note 1.
237. Joe Adler, Agencies Reject Calls for Freer Rein on Exotic Mortgages, AM.
BANKER, Oct. 2, 2006, at 1.
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